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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH ,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
:

Case No. 20030677-CA

JAMES ANDREW NARANJO,
Defendant/Appellant

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a jury's finding of guilt of one count of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) on June 30, 2003, and the trial court's denial
of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence on June 16, 2003. The Defendant was
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison on August 5, 2003.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour over provision in U.C.A. § 78-2a30X2003).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID OFFICER VALENTINE VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT WHEN HE DETAINED AND SEARCHED THE
DEFENDANT?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's finding of facts should be

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions
of law should be reviewed for correctness. This is a search and seizure case, therefore
this Court should grant the trial court's legal determinations a measure of discretion in
applying the standard to the given facts. See, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Ct.
App. 2003). This issue was preserved in the trial court when the Defendant's attorney
filed a written motion to suppress the evidence, (R. 014-017), and when he renewed
the motion to suppress during the trial. (R. 113/59).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
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Section 78-2a-3(j)(2003) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 001). A preliminary hearing was held on
April 15, 2003. The Defendant was bound over to stand trial. (R. 008-09). On May
12, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 014-018). The State
responded with a written objection to the motion to suppress. (R. 021-032). Oral
arguments on the motion were held on June 16, 2003.

The trial court denied

Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 038). The trial judge asked the
State to prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order. (R. 112/26). A
review of the record suggests that this was not done. The official court record does
not include findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a signed order denying the
motion to suppress. A jury trial was held on June 30, 2003. The Defendant was
found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a
first-degree felony.

During the trial, Defendant's attorney renewed his motion to

suppress. (R. 113/59). The state dismissed count two of the original information,
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.

(R. 050-51).

The

Defendant was sentenced on August 5, 2003 to a term of five years to life at the Utah
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State Prison.

(R. 100). The sentence, judgment and commitment was signed on

August 6, 2003. A notice of appeal was filed August 11, 2003.
STATEiWENT OF THE FACTS
On January 5, 2003, Officer David Valentine ("Valentine") of the Weber State
University Police Department received a dispatch that a professor had seen a Hispanic
male wearing a red jacket was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot on the Weber
State campus. (R. 113/18). Officer Valentine exited the Social Science Building and
was walking to his car when he noticed the Defendant wearing a red coat riding his
bicycle. (R. 115/7). Officer Valentine got into his marked police car and pulled up
behind the Defendant as he was still riding his bike. (R. 115/7). Officer Valentine
used either his car horn or air horn to get Defendant's attention as he pulled up behind
him. (R. 115/7-8).
The Defendant stopped riding his bike. He put his feet down on the ground and
turned back to look at the officer. (R. 115/8). Officer Valentine got out of his vehicle
and indicated that he wanted to talk to the Defendant. (R. 115/8-9). The Defendant
said he was going "up over here" as he pointed to the southwest. He then pedaled
away. (R. 115/9). Officer Valentine got back into his patrol car and followed after
him. The Defendant was riding his bike up a hill in the wrong lane of traffic. (R.
115/12). Officer Valentine noticed a "black object" in one of the Defendants back
pockets. Officer Valentine did not know what it was, but it appeared to be metallic.
(R. 115/9).
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Officer Valentine activated his emergency lights. He looked down as he did
this. (R. 115/10). When Officer Valentine looked back up the Defendant's bicycle
was laying in the street and he was walking towards the patrol vehicle. (R. 115/11).
The Defendant was making eye contact with Officer Valentine as he approached his
vehicle. He was talking on a cell phone and was making what the officer described as
a "steady aggressive walk toward the passenger side on my car." (R. 115/12). During
the trial, Valentine was asked what the Defendant did that was angry or aggressive.
(R. 113/27-28) His answer was, "the eye contact for one, the constant staring eye
contact as he was walking in a deliberate manner approaching my vehicle."
113/28).

(R.

As Defendant was approaching the patrol vehicle, Officer Valentine

observed him put his hand in one of his front pockets and retrieve an item that
Valentine believed he was hiding from him. (R. 115/13).
Officer Valentine got out of his car and began conversing with the Defendant.
Valentine told the Defendant to show him what was in his hand. (R. 115/13). Officer
Valentine was concerned that the Defendant was hiding a weapon. He also testified
that Defendant was aggressively approaching his vehicle. When asked what he was
doing that made the approach aggressive, the officer testified that he had an "angry,
angry stare." (R. 115/14).

During cross-examination at the trial, Officer Valentine

testified that Defendant was talking on a cell phone as he approached him.

He

initially had the cell phone in his left hand but he didn't see what he did with it.
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Valentine admitted that the object that was in his right hand could have been the cell
phone. (R. 113/58).
Officer Valentine testified that the Defendant was yelling at him, but he
couldn't understand what he was saying. (R. 115/14). At the trial, Valentine testified
that Defendant was talking on a cell phone. He stated that "I had heard him tell the
person on the phone that the cop wants to talk to me so, yes, he was yelling at me and
talking on his cell phone." (R. 113/57). Officer Valentine told the Defendant to step
around to the front of the vehicle. (R. 115/15). The Defendant walked around to the
front of the vehicle as directed. However, he didn't stop there. He continued to walk
towards Officer Valentine who was behind the driver's side door. (R. 115/15).
Officer Valentine drew his gun and told Defendant to stop.

Defendant

continued to walk so Officer Valentine pointed his gun at Defendant. At this point,
Defendant stopped walking towards the officer. (R. 115/16). Officer Valentine told
Defendant to show him his hands. The Defendant began emptying his pockets and
"tossing objects into the grass." Id.

Officer Valentine later discovered that the

Defendant had thrown a screwdriver that looked like a miniature crowbar, a "rasp"
file, and a flashlight. (R. 115/116-17). The Defendant also threw or dropped a cell
phone, a protective case for a car stereo, a bandana, a CD and "assorted items." (R.
115/18). Defendant was yelling "you want to see what's in my hand, do you want to
see what I've got" as he emptied his pockets. Id.
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Officer Valentine ordered the Defendant to his knees. He continued to empty
his pockets and then knelt down. (R. 115/19). Officer Valentine ordered him to lay
down on the pavement. Id. Officer Valentine handcuffed him and then frisked him.
Id. Valentine stood him up and then began patting him down for weapons. Valentine
lifted the Defendant's pant leg up and a plastic bindle fell out of his right pant leg. (R.
115/21). While Valentine was conducting the pat down, the Defendant kept pressing
his hip against the patrol car. Valentine believed that the Defendant had something
that he didn't want him to find. (R. 115/22). Valentine then "began taking him to the
ground . . . " Id.
At this point, another officer arrived and took control of the Defendant. (R.
115/23). Valentine picked up the bindle and the Defendant stated, "that's heroin."
(R. 115/24). He also indicated that he was delivering it to a friend. Id.
On cross-examination, the officer admitted that he had his gun out and he told
the Defendant to show him what was in his hand and that's when the Defendant
started throwing things onto the ground. (R. 115/33). Officer Valentine was asked
why he decided to frisk Defendant and he answered, "I don't know what's in his
possession, I need to look out for myself. . ." Id. Officer Valentine hadn't noticed
any bulges in Defendant's pockets. Id. Defense counsel asked Officer Valentine why
he decided to frisk the Defendant.

Valentine answered. "It's procedure.

Thaf s

something I do when I'm going to handcuff somebody. That's what I'm taught." (R.
115/34).
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Valentine acknowledged that Defendant wasn't under arrest, but he has being
handcuffed "for our safety; my safety and his safety."

Id.

Valentine then

acknowledged that his information was only that the Defendant was looking in
windows and he had no reason to believe that Defendant had done anything illegal.
(R. 115/34-35). Officer Valentine was asked a second time why he handcuffed
Defendant. (R. 115/35). His response was "his aggressive nature and behavior." Id.
After an objection, defense counsel asked "was he yelling at you because you stopped
him?" Id.
Valentine answered, "I don't know why he was yelling at me."
counsel asked "what was he saying to you?"

Defense

Valentine answered, "I couldn't

understand at first." Defense counsel asked, what did he say when you heard him?"
valentine answered, "He was saying, you want to see what's in my pockets, I'll show
you what I've got."
Defense counsel replied, "But you stopped him, you pulled your gun on him,
you ordered him to the ground, you handcuffed, him correct? He wasn't under arrest,
you had no information he had committed any crimes at that time, correct?" (R.
115/35-36) Officer Valentine answered, "correct." (R. 115/36). Officer Valentine
also acknowledged that when he frisked the Defendant, he pulled up his right pant leg
and that's when the bindle of heroin fell out. Id. Defense counsel said, "now, that
wasn't a pat-down. You were actually pulling up the pant leg to see what was there,
correct?"
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Officer Valentine answered, "I couldn't bend over far enough to safely do it so
I lifted the pant leg, yes." Id. Valentine hadn't seen any criminal activity up to this
point and he didn't have consent to pull up Defendant's pant leg and it was when he
pulled up the pant leg that the bindle fell out. (R. 115/37). Officer Valentine later
explained that the reason he pulled the pants up rather than do a pat down was because
he's "a rather large officer with a big belly and I'm still trying to control his hands
with one hand and yet still safely reach down to his ankle and I couldn't feel his ankle
--" (R. 115/39).

During the trial Officer Valentine admitted that he pulled up

Defendant's pant leg so he could see his sock and that he couldn't see it without
pulling up the pant leg. (R. 113/58).
The substance that was found in the bindle was sent to the State crime lab. It
was tested by a chemist and tested positive as heroin. (R. 113/90).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches was violated repeatedly during his encounter with Officer Valentine. The
first violation occurred when Officer Valentine detained the Defendant without
sufficient facts that would suggest the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
The Defendant was upset by this detention and angrily emptied his pockets. Officer
Valentine pointed his gun at the Defendant and then ordered him to the ground.
Defendant's rights were further violated when Officer Valentine handcuffed him and
proceeded to frisk him. For arguments sake even if this Court found that Officer
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Valentine's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, his frisk of the
Defendant exceeded the scope of what is allowed by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)- Officer Valentine lifted the Defendant's pant leg and while
he did this a bindle of heroin fell out. Since Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
were violated the evidence that was discovered should have been suppressed by the
trial court.
ARGUMENT
OFFICER VALENTINE VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN
HE DETAINED
AND
SEARCHED HIM.
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters
between law enforcement officers and the general public.
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion7 that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed;'
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987)(citations omitted).
The Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated throughout his
encounter with Officer Valentine. It began with the level two detention that wasn't
supported by reasonable suspicion and continued when Defendant was ordered at
gunpoint to submit to a search of his person. Each of these issues will be more fully
articulated below.
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A.

The initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

The encounter between Defendant and Officer Valentine was a level two
stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. A level one encounter "is a
voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to
leave at any time." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In
contrast, a level two stop occurs "when a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." Id.

It is a level two stop

"even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A "totality of the circumstances" test should be employed to determine if a stop
is a level two stop that requires reasonable suspicion.

Under the totality of the

circumstances, this was clearly a level two stop. Officer Valentine pulled his marked
patrol vehicle behind the Defendant and honked his horn.

When the Defendant

stopped riding his bike, the officer got out of his vehicle and told the Defendant that
he needed to talk to him. (R. 115/7-9). The Defendant communicated to the officer
by his actions that he didn't want to speak with him. This was clear when he began
pedaling his bicycle away from the officer. (R. 115/9). Officer Valentine followed
after him and actually turned on his red and blue lights. (R. 115/10). When Officer
Valentine looked back up, the Defendant had set his bike down and was walking back
to him. (R. 115/11). By activating the red and blue lights on top of the police vehicle,
Officer Valentine communicated to the Defendant that he must stop and that he was
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not free to leave. This was clearly a show of authority and it would have been a
criminal offense for the Defendant to have ignored the lights and to continue to pedal
away. There is no citizen who would feel free to leave when a police officer has told
you he needs to talk to you and then turns on the red and blue lights on top of the
patrol vehicle.
Even though the State argued that this was a level one encounter, (R. 112/6),
the trial judge found that it was a level two stop. "At that point, when he turns on the
lights, his overhead lights, it does seem to me that's a Level II stop at that point by
turning those lights on." (R. 112/24).
Since Officer Valentine initiated a Level II stop, he needed "specific,
articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about
to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The official record is void of any written findings of fact and conclusions of
law. However, the trial court made oral findings at the conclusion of the hearing on
the motion to suppress.

The Court found that the following facts gave Officer

Valentine reasonable suspicion that justified the initial detention. "First of all, we've
got a known informant who contacted - who is a criminal justice professor who
contacts dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles and gives a
description of some clothing apparently. Then the dispatch relays that information on
to the officer. The officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I recall it,
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he sees a person who matches the description that he's been given from the dispatch.
He gets into his police car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding
his bike at that point.
He does do this - - what I think is really agreed upon - - Level I stop at a point
by either honking his air or car horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something
to the effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back on his bike and
pedals away. He does pedal away in the opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit
unusual. And the officer also notices a black object extending - - a metallic object
extending from the back pocket of Mr. Naranjo..
. . .Then the officer turns on his lights. It's unclear at that point if he knew
more than what I've just recited or not, but to me that alone is sufficient - - reasonable
suspicion could be based on those articulable facts alone in my mind." (R. 112/2324).
The trial court apparently found that the following facts gave Officer Valentine
reasonable suspicion. 1) A criminal justice professor describes a person looking in
vehicles and gives a description of the clothing that person was wearing. 2) The
officer sees a person who matches the description. 3) After the officer initiates a level
one stop, the suspect says he's going "over there" and then pedals away in the
opposing lane of traffic which is "a bit unusual." 4) As the Defendant is pedaling
away, the officer notices a black metallic object extending from the back pocket of the
Defendant.
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Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Valentine lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop and detain the Defendant. Under this analysis, there must be "a
suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The only information known to
the officer was that a person had looked in car windows, the Defendant matched that
persons description, the Defendant didn't want to talk to the officer and he had a black
metallic object in his back pocket.

There is nothing in these facts to support a level

two detention.
The officer admitted that he didn't even have information that the Defendant
had done anything illegal (R. 115/34-35). It is not against the law to look into a
vehicle. There are a number of innocent reasons that might cause someone to look
inside a vehicle. Furthermore, a person might look at an object through a window and
consider stealing it, but then reconsider and walk away. There is no crime in the
thought, provided the person doesn't enter or attempt to enter the vehicle. In this case,
Officer Valentine did not have any information that the person looking inside the
vehicles ever attempted to enter one of them.
The evidence from the preliminary hearing was used as a factual basis for the
motion to suppress. The dispatch tape was played at the preliminary hearing but was
not transcribed into the record. (R. 115/5-6). During the hearing on the motion to
suppress, Defendant's attorney did give insight into the information that was on the
tape.

u

[H]e said he saw a suspicious person looking in the vehicles, that in and of
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itself I would submit is not enough without saying how many vehicles? How he was
looking into them? What made him suspicious? Did he look in one vehicle? Did he
look in a dozen? How was he looking into them? Was it a casual glance or was he
staring into them with his eyes up against them? You know, like I said, it could have
been one vehicle. There may have been something interesting on the seat, an article
in the newspaper, a headline or something that caught his eye. We don't know that
based upon what's in the dispatch tapes and in the testimony . . ." (R. 112/20-21).
During the trial, the officer indicated that dispatch told him that an individual
had "called in and reported seeing a Hispanic male wearing a red type of jacket or
coat that was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot." (R. 113/18). Again, there is
no information that criminal activity was actually afoot, and when the officer
observed the Defendant he was not looking in vehicles, but instead was riding his bike
through campus.
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), an officer observed three
individuals walking slowly and peering into business windows at 3:30 a.m. There had
been several "car prowls" in the area in prior weeks. The trio looked in windows, but
steadily progressed down the street.

The officer stopped his car at the curb and

watched the trio. He noticed a nylon knapsack the defendant carried at his side. He
observed the defendant shift the knapsack from his side to his front in what the officer
considered an effort to conceal it.

The officer did not see the trio violate any

ordinances or engage in any criminal behavior. The officer eventually approached the
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trio. The defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can in an effort that the
officer regarded as an effort to "stash it." All three individuals walked towards the
officer and he asked them for identification and what they were doing. They appeared
nervous as they did this. Id. at 86.
A back-up officer arrived. When the back-up arrived the original officer took
hold of the defendant, told him to place his hands on the patrol car and spread his feet.
The officer then patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. The officer found a
knife strapped to the defendant's chest and he was eventually charged with possession
of a weapon by a restricted person. Id.
This Court found that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional and the
facts did not support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in
criminal conduct. Id. at 89. The Court stated that the defendant "progressed steadily
south on State Street. They did not retrace their steps, stare repeatedly in the same
store window 'casing' the business, or hover repeatedly on the same street corner."
Id.
In the case at bar, the Defendant was riding his bike across campus on a Sunday
at 1:20 p.m. when he was stopped. The information the officer had was insufficient to
believe that the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Valentine had been told
that a suspicious person was looking in car windows.

Defendant's trial attorney

correctly noted that "he said he saw a suspicious person looking in the vehicles, that
in and of itself I would submit is not enough without saying how many vehicles? How
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he was looking into them? What made him suspicious? Did he look in one vehicle?
Did he look in a dozen? How was he looking into them? Was it a casual glance or
was he staring into them with his eyes up against them? You know, like I said, it
could have been one vehicle. There may have been something interesting on the seat,
an article in the newspaper, a headline or something that caught his eye. We don't
know that based upon what's in the dispatch tapes and in the testimony . . ." (R.
112/20-21).

The officer simply did not have enough information, nor did he

personally observe the Defendant do anything that would justify a detention.
An officer may rely on a dispatched report to make a stop. However, the
agency that makes the dispatch must have sufficient reasonable suspicion, through
specific and articulable facts, to justify a detention. See, United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 232 (1985). If there are insufficient facts, as there are in this case, then the
officer must provide independent or corroborating information through his personal
observations.

See, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Valentine did not observe any conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe
that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity.

The fact that he noticed a

Hispanic male in a red jacket is not corroboration. See, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)("This is not corroboration of criminal activity, only of
physical characteristics that by themselves have no relevance to criminal activity.").
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Since Officer Valentine did not have reasonable suspicion that justified
stopping and detaining the Defendant the evidence that was discovered should have
been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
B.

Officer Valentine didn't have reasonable suspicion to conduct a
Terry frisk.

Even if this Court finds that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to stop
and detain the Defendant, Officer Valentine was not justified in ordering Defendant to
the ground and conducting a Terry frisk. In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court held that officers can frisk a suspect following an investigatory stop to allow
police officers to protect themselves. See, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Even though a defendant may be stopped as part of an investigatory stop, he is
still protected from unreasonable searches by the Fourth Amendment. "[The Supreme
Court] declared that the Fourth Amendment unquestionably protected suspects
subjected to investigatory confrontations." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). Each frisk must be "justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." Terry v. Ohio, at 20. The reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a Teny
frisk must be separate and independent from the reasonable suspicion that justified the
initial detention. "Where a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory
or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and
dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or pat-down' search of the individual to
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discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Warren, 37 P.3d 270, 273
(Utah Ct. App. 2001)(emphasis in original)(quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659
(Utah 1985). The State has the burden to show that the circumstances created the
need for the frisk. See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
Terry v. Ohio authorized "a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Terry v. Ohio, at
27. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably, "due weight must be given,
not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience." Id.
Officer Valentine was not able to point to specific articulable facts that
indicated the Defendant was armed or dangerous. After Officer Valentine turned on
his blue and red lights and the Defendant put his bike down, the Defendant began
walking towards Officer Valentine's passenger door. At various times during the
preliminary hearing and trial, Officer Valentine testified about the factors that caused
him to conduct a Terry frisk. Officer Valentine apparently relied on the following
factors.

First, as Defendant approached his passenger door he had "a steady

aggressive walk toward the passenger side of my car and he's making eye contact
with me at the time that he's approaching me. (R. 115/12). At the trial Valentine
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described it as "a angry, aggressive manner." (R. 113/27). When asked what he
meant by that, he stated "The eye contact for one, the constant, staring eye contact as
he was walking in a deliberate manner approaching my vehicle." (R. 113/28.)
The second factor Valentine testified about was that there was an object in the
Defendant's hand that he couldn't see. "I'm looking straight out window [sic] and I
see one of his hands go in one of his front pockets, . . . and he comes out with
something that was being palmed in the palm of his hands. He was hiding it from
me."

(R. 115/13).

This changed a little bit at the trial.

The prosecutor asked

Valentine if he could tell whether or not the Defendant had something for sure in his
hands. (R. 113/29). Officer Valentine answered, "I couldn't. It was turned away
from me. I couldn't see if he had withdrawn anything from the pocket or not."
Third, Valentine testified that the Defendant was yelling at him.

"He was

yelling at me and I really couldn't understand exactly what he was yelling at me at
that point." (R. 115/14).
The fourth factor was that Defendant wouldn't show him his hands. (R. 115/15,
R. 113/29-30). The fifth factor was that Defendant continued walking towards the
officer. "He continued on around and rounded the driver's side of my vehicle and
continued on toward me.

(R. 113/32). At this point Officer Valentine drew his

weapon. Id. When Defendant saw the weapon he stopped and began tossing items.
(R. 113/33). The Defendant "tossed the item that was in his hand." Id. He then began
emptying his pockets and throwing the items from his pockets onto the ground. (R.
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113/34). At this point Valentine hadn't given Defendant any instructions other than to
stop and show him his hands. Id. While the Defendant was emptying his pockets he
was yelling "Do you want to see what's in my pockets? I'll show you what I've got,
this is what I've got." (R. 113/35).
As Defendant was emptying his pockets Valentine ordered him to his knees.
(R. 113/36). When Defendant finished emptying his pockets he went to his knees. Id.
Valentine ordered him to place his hands out in front of him and lay down on the
sidewalk, to which he complied. Id. While the Defendant was laying in the street
Valentine placed him in handcuffs and helped him to his feet. (R. 113/37). Valentine
then began frisking the Defendant. Id.
On cross examination at the preliminary hearing, Defendant's attorney asked
Valentine why he decided to frisk the Defendant. Valentine answered, "I don't know
what's in his possession, I need to look out for myself - -" (R. 115/33). Valentine
admitted that he didn't see any bulges in Defendant's pockets.

(R. 115/33-34).

Valentine had watched Defendant empty his pockets including the metallic bar he's
seen in his back pocket. (R. 115/34). After Valentine acknowledged that he had seen
Defendant empty his pockets, Defendant's attorney asked him a second time why he
decided to conduct a frisk.

Valentine's response was "It's procedure.

That's

something I do when I'm going to handcuff somebody. That's what I'm taught." Id.
When asked why he was handcuffing Defendant, Valentine answered, "For our safety;
my safety and his safety." Id.
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Valentine then acknowledged that his only information was that Defendant was
looking in windows and that that act wasn't illegal. Id. Valentine also acknowledged
that he didn't have reason to believe that Defendant had done anything illegal. (R.
115/34-35.) Valentine was asked why he handcuffed Defendant and he answered,
"His aggressive nature and behavior.

I didn't know what his intentions - -" (R.

115/35).
Although the officer characterized the Defendant's behavior as "aggressive,"
when pressed as to what was aggressive, he could only point to an angry stare. (R.
113/28). Valentine also pointed to the Defendant yelling at him. The only specific
statements that he heard the Defendant yell was, "Do you want to see what's in my
pockets? I'll show you what I've got, this is what I've got." (R. 113/35).
These factors didn't give Officer Valentine reasonable suspicion to conduct a
Terry frisk. Especially when Defendant had already thrown the object Valentine was
concerned with and had also emptied his pockets. In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court held that "prior to instituting a frisk, a police officer
must reasonably conclude in light of his experience that the unusual conduct he
observes might suggest criminal activity and danger." Id. at 660. Officer Valentine
acknowledge that he didn't have reason to believe that Defendant had done anything
illegal. (R. 115/34-35). The Defendant's response to Officer valentine was more
consistent with someone being upset about being stopped and harassed by a police
officer then it was indicative of criminal activity or danger. For these reasons, the
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evidence that was found during the alleged "frisk" should have been suppressed by
the trial court.
C.

The search of the Defendant's pant leg exceeded the scope of a Terry
frisk.

Even if this Court finds that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion that
justified stopping the Defendant, and reasonable suspicion that justified a Terry frisk,
this Court should find that the officer exceeded the scope of a Teny frisk. A Terry
frisk is "a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons . . ." Terry v. Ohio, at 30 (emphasis added).
A Terry frisk is less intrusive then a search and requires reasonable suspicion
versus probable cause. See, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 (1981).

It is

also limited to the outer clothing. In the case at bar, Officer Valentine exceeded the
scope of a proper frisk when he lifted the Defendant's pant leg. When Valentine
pulled up the Defendant's pant leg the bindle of heroin fell out.

(R. 115/37).

Valentine was asked by Defendant's attorney why he pulled the pant leg up instead of
patting it. (R. 115/38). His answer was "I'm a rather large officer with a big belly
and I'm still trying to control his hands with one hand and yet still safely reach down
to his ankle and I couldn't feel his ankle - -" (R. 115/38-39).

Valentine later

acknowledged that he chose to lift the pant leg up instead of patting it. (R. 115/39).
During the trial, Valentine testified that "I couldn't reach the ankle area in his pant
leg. I've got the vest on and the belt and my big belly so I was having a hard time
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controlling his hands. He still wanted to get the hands around to the side area, so I
had to control the hands and I couldn't safely reach down and grab his ankle and feel,
so I lifted up the pant leg to visually inspect the sock area." (R. 113/40). It was when
Valentine did this that the heroin fell out. "When I lifted the pant leg up that's when
the bindle fell to the ground." Id.
When Valentine lifted the pant leg he was no longer conducting a frisk of the
outer clothing. This was a search that requires probable cause. There is no big belly
or fat officer exception to the Terry doctrine. A Terry frisk is a narrow and limited
search of a suspect's outer clothing. The trial court erred when it found that this more
intrusive search "was in conformance with the idea that backs up Terry" (R. 112/26).
Officer Valentine had called for back-up and another officer arrived shortly after he
searched the Defendant's pant leg. (R. 115/22). If Valentine's big belly prevented
him from conducting a proper Terry frisk he simply could have waited for the back-up
officer to arrive and had him perform the frisk.
In State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court noted that
"there is ample authority to support the proposition that requiring a suspect to disclose
the contents of his or her pockets constitutes a search requiring probable cause." Id. at
fn. 12. In the same vein, just as an officer reaching a hand into a pocket requires
probable cause, so should pulling up a pant leg to inspect a sock. Since the officer
exceeded the scope of a limited Terry frisk, this Court should reverse the Defendant's
conviction in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
Officer Valentine violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right throughout
this encounter. The stopped and detained Defendant without sufficient reasonable
suspicion that he was engaged in illegal activity. He then proceeded to conduct a
Terry frisk without reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed or dangerous.
Finally, he exceeded the scope of that frisk by lifting the Defendant's pant leg. For
these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse Defendant's
conviction.
DATED this , _ day of March, 2004.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark
Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this _ day of March,
2004.
_ _ ^

^

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney at Law

25

-

^

>

ADDENDUM

26

ADDENDUM A

A - *

CCUM

iJvji A J

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT,

vs ,

Case N o : 0 3 1 9 0 1 3 6 6

JAMES ANDREW

NARANJO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

COMMITMENT

FS

SCOTT M HADLEY
August 5, 2 003

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE
Prosecutor: CAMILLE L. NEIDER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN V GRAVIS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 1, 1971
Video
CHARGES
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE
- Disposition: 06/30/2003 Guilty

1st Degree Felony

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST
C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

100

Case No: 031901366
Date:
Aug 05, 2003

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court recommends credit for time served.

Dated this

£

day of

tfiss^x^
rfi^^jT

, 20 Q3 .

SCOTT M HADLEY
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

101

ADDENDUM B

23

just this case but the law, too, so it's more difficult than
it probably would be to somebody who's experienced, but here
is what I'm going to rule:

I'm going to deny the motion to

suppress, and I'm going to do so for these reasons -- here's
what I find to be the most important facts to me in making
this decision:
First of all, we've got a known informant who
contacted —

who is a criminal justice professor who contacts

dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles
and gives a description of some clothing apparently.

Then

the dispatch relays that information on to the officer.

The

officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I
recall it, he sees

a person who matches the description that

he's been given from the dispatch.

He gets into his police

car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding
his bike at that point.
He does do this —

what I think is really agreed upon --

Level I stop at a point by either honking his air or car
horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something to the
effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back
on his bike and pedals away.

He does pedal away in the

opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit unusual.
the officer also notices a black object extending -- a
metallic object extending from the back pocket of
Mr. Naranjo.

And
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At that point -- it seems to me it ! s undisputed at that
point those facts.

Both sides seem to agree that those are

the fact at that point.
lights.

Then the officer turns on his

It's unclear at that point if he knew more than what

I!ve just recited or not, but to me that alone is
sufficient -- reasonable suspicion could be based on those
articulable facts alone in my mind.
At that point, when he turns on the light, his overhead
lights, it does seem to me thatfs a Level II stop at that
point by turning those lights on.

He does —

and it ! s

unclear whether he sees the bicycle down in the travel lane
on Dixon Drive whether that enters into his decision or not
in turning on the lights, that was unclear to me at least
from the transcript.
But it's clear at around that same point in time when
he's turned on the lights that the defendant is approaching
the officer, the officer describes it as aggressive, that he
has an angry stare with him, he's yelling.

He goes to the

passenger side of the car, he sees Mr. Naranjo put his hand
in his front pocket and comes out with something and he's
concealing what that is from the officer's sight.
And then when the officer gets out and he's talking to
Mr. Naranjo, Mr. Naranjo is described as yelling at that
point.

He's asked to step around in front of the vehicle and

keep his hands in sight.

Mr. Naranjo disobeys that order

